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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, the acceleration of two international trends-nationalism
and economic interdependence-has heightened the ancient problem of
extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction, or to what extent states may apply their
laws outside their borders. Economic interdependence has prompted states to
t J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School, 1997. The author would like to thank Professor Paul Kahn for
his comments on an earlier draft.
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regulate transactions occurring outside their borders,' but states with concurrent
jurisdiction over the same matters have often resisted these assertions of
extraterritorial jurisdiction on the grounds of territorial sovereignty. 2 European
states, for example, have vociferously protested the extraterritorial provisions
of the Reagan administration's pipeline regulations3 and the recent Cuban
embargo legislation, known as the Helms-Burton Act.4 The existence of such
tension creates a temptation to fashion a legal regime that would govern
conflicts of jurisdiction between states.
A decade ago the American Law Institute (ALI) attempted to fashion such
a regime in the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States.' The key jurisdictional provision of the Restatement (hird) was the
"reasonableness requirement" of section 403, which stated that when a state has
an accepted basis for prescriptive jurisdiction, it may not exercise that
jurisdiction when it would be "unreasonable" to do so.6 The restators claim that
this requirement reflects customary international law.7 At the same time, the
Restatement (Third) adopts a positivist conception of international law, under
which customary norms derive from state practice and opinio juris,8 rather than
a naturalist view of international law, under which norms derive from a notion
of the good or the just.9 Despite this adoption of a "hard" approach, the
restators allowed their normative conception of the customary law of
prescriptive jurisdiction to color their analysis of the existing law.
This Note argues that the reasonableness requirement of Restatement
(Third) section 403 did not reflect the state of customary international law when
the treatise was published in 1987, at least to the extent that it did not
acknowledge that the United States had persistently objected to the emergence
1. See J.G. CASTEL, ExTRATERRITORIALITY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: CANADA AND UNITED
STATES OF AMmuECA PRACTICES COMPARED 1 (1988).
2. See Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality and Conflicts of Jurisdiction, Address Before the
American Society of International Law (Apr. 15, 1983), in UNITED STATES ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST
CUBA 224, 226 (Michael Krinsky & David Golove eds., 1993) (noting sensitivity of states to sovereignty
issues in "this modem age of nationalism").
3. See infra notes 86-88.
4. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785
(1996) (codified at U.S.C.A. §§ 6021-6091 (West 1997)).
5. RE TATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987)
[hereinafter RESTATEmENT (THIRD)].
6. Id. § 403(1).
7. See id. § 403 cmt. a ("The principle that an exercise of jurisdiction... is... unlawful if it is
unreasonable is established in United States law, and has emerged as a principle of international law as
well."); see also id. at 231 ("Increasingly ... these rules [of prescriptive jurisdiction], notably the principle
of reasonableness ... have been followed by other states and their courts and by international tribunals, and
have emerged as principles of customary law.").
8. See id. § 102; see also Ruth Wedgwood, Immunity and Prescription, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 489,
493 (1989) ("The Third Restatement takes a positivist view in which law is established by will and consent,
not derived from any transcendent principle of nature... ."). Legal scholarship is dominated by this "hard"
view of sources. See DAVwD KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRuCrURES 35 n.41 (1987).
9. Under a "soft" view of sources, states are bound even without their consent by authoritative
rules derived from notions of the good or the just. See KENNEDY, supra note 8, at 29-30; see also MARTrI
KosKENN, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 270-73
(1989) (stating objections to reliance on consent as sole source of international law).
[Vol. 22: 419
The ALI's Reasonableness Requirement
of such a rule. Indeed, in 1993, the Supreme Court essentially rejected the view
that the reasonableness requirement reflects customary law.1" Nevertheless,
U.S. courts, the State Department, and legal scholars have cited the
reasonableness requirement as customary law and thereby contributed to the
development of that norm. Moreover, the restators probably intended for the
Restatement (Third) to have this influence.
Part II discusses the background of the Restatement process and the
division of opinion over whether Restatements should state existing law or
promote change in the law. Part Ill discusses the origins and content of the
reasonableness requirement, and Part IV argues that this standard does not
reflect customary international law. Part V documents the extent to which the
reasonableness requirement nevertheless has been influential. Finally, Part VI
argues that the development of a reasonableness requirement is undesirable, and
that the ALI should, in the Restatement (Fourth), indicate that the standard has
not become customary law.
II. THE ALl AND THE RESTATEMENT PROCESS
The American Law Institute was founded in 1923 to promote the
"clarification and simplification of the law and its better adaptation to social
needs."' Its founding members perceived that the rapid increase in the number
of common law decisions in the previous decades had created a high degree of
legal uncertainty that could be reduced through the publication of authoritative
"Restatements. "12 After the ALI embarked on this project, a disagreement
quickly arose between the proponents of two views of the Restatements'
function: that of stating existing law and that of promoting desirable change in
the law. 13
After pursuing the former approach during its first two decades, 4 the ALI
changed course and began to adopt rules supported by a minority of
jurisdictions when the majority rules seemed less sound. 5 One such adoption
of a minority rule in the Restatement (Second) of Torts-in a section calling for
strict product liability under certain circumstances-was criticized by the
defense bar as a departure from the ALI's traditional role of stating the existing
10. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 797-98 (1993) (holding that under
comity principles, court should decline to exercise jurisdiction under Sherman Act when actual conflict
arises).
11. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Forword to RESTATEMENT (THIm) at xi (internal quotation marks
omitted).
12. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Refreshing Institutional Memories: Wisconsin and the American
Law Institute: The Fairchild Lecture, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 1, 11-12 (1995). For background on the ALI and
its founding, see GEOFFREY C. HAzARD, THE AMERICAN LAW INSTrmTE: WHAT IT Is AND WHAT IT DoES
1-12 (1994); JoHN HONNOLD, THE LFE OF THE LAw 144-80 (1964) (collection of materials addressing
Restatements); and Herbert Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, 55 A.B.A. J. 147 (1969).
13. See Abrahamson, supra note 12, at 17.
14. See id. at 19.
15. See id. at 20 (describing Restatements published after Second World War).
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law. 16 In response, Herbert Wechsler, then Director of the American Law
Institute, argued that there is no clear distinction between what the law "is" and
what it "should be":
I asked, therefore, if the statement of a rule does not involve something more than the
conclusion that it is supported by the past decisions, for this is an implicit judgment that our
courts today would not perceive a change of situation calling for the adaptation of the rule or
even for a new departure. And if we ask ourselves what courts will do in fact within an area,
can we divorce our answers wholly from our view of what they ought to do, given the factors
that appropriately influence their judgments, under the prevailing view of the judicial
function? 7
In Wechsler's view, ALI restators would view their role as a judicial one and
would not ignore opportunities to fill gaps in the law.
Against the background of this controversy, in 1965 the ALI published the
Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
covering both international law binding on the United States and U.S. law
affecting the conduct of foreign relations.18 The ALI presented the Restatement
(Second) as "an attempt to state and clarify existing law" rather than as an
attempt to "propose rules of law for adoption."19 Reviewers were divided as to
the Restatement (Second)'s success in doing so. Some sections were praised for
accurately reflecting customary law." Critics argued, however, that other
sections, including a key jurisdictional provision, did not reflect international
law.
21
16. See Wechsler, supra note 12, at 149. Other Restatements have been similarly criticized. See,
e.g., W. Noel Keyes, The Restatement (Second): Its Misleading Quality and a Proposalfor Its Amelioration,
13 PEPP. L. REv. 23, 25 (1985) (criticizing Restatement (Second) of Contracts as "simply the views of the
drafter rather than any real attempt to restate what is the general common law").
17. Wechsler, supra note 12, at 149.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Op aHE FOREIGN RE.Am'IoNs LAw OF Ta UNITED STATES at xi (1965)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)]. There is no "first" restatement of foreign relations law; the
Restatement (Second) was so named because it represented the second effort by the ALI to restate U.S.
foreign relations law. See Panel Discussion, The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
Revised: How Were the Controversies Resolved?, 81 PRoc. AM. Soc'y INT'L L. 180, 180 (1987)
[hereinafter 1987 ASIL Panel] (remarks of Harold Maier).
In 1923, the ALI had deemed international law an unsuitable topic for restatement. See Report of the
Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the Improvement of the Law Proposing
the Establishment ofan American Law Institute, 1 A.L.I. PRoc. 1, 44 (1923) ("The unsuitability of a subject
for immediate treatment may come from a variety of causes.... [lit may not be in the power of the bar by
a restatement, however good, to attain desirable results. Such a subject is international law.").
19. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) at xi.
20. See Covey T. Oliver, Foreword, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1984) (noting that Restatement
(Second) was "old school" restatement that mirrored existing law); see also Oliver J. Lissitzyn, The Law
of International Agreements in the Restatement, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 96, 112 (1966) (suggesting that
Restatement (Second)'s formulation of norms governing international treaties constituted useful clarification
and codification of customary law).
21. See Stanley D. Metzger, The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States:
Bases and Conflicts of Jurisdiction, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 7, 19-20 (1966) (arguing that Restatement (Second)
section 40, which stated that international law required states to consider moderating their exercise of
jurisdiction when another state had concurrent jurisdiction, was not supported by authority and did not
reflect view of U.S. government officials); see also Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a
Crossroads, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 294 (1982) (citing Metzger's argument with approval); Cornelius F.
Murphy, Jr., State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 125, 136 (1966) (stating that
Restatement (Second)'s rules with respect to economic injuries to aliens "do not reflect a consensus adequate
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International law developed in the postwar period at such a rate that within
two decades the ALI expanded and updated its work with the publication of the
Restatement (Third).z Like its predecessor, the Restatement (Third) purported
to reflect existing law; it represented the ALI's opinion as to "the rules that an
impartial tribunal would apply if charged with deciding a controversy in
accordance with international law."' Again, reviewers were divided as to its
success in this regard. Numerous commentators reviewing Restatement (Third)
section 403 have argued that it does not reflect customary international law.'
One reviewer has argued that the Restatement (Third)'s formulation of the
"effects" doctrine jurisdiction does not reflect U.S. or customary law. 5
Other provisions of the Restatement (Third) that were criticized for not
reflecting customary law include those on the law of the sea,' the act of state
doctrine,' and treaty interpretation.' Reviewers have said that other provisions
of the Restatement (Third)-on human rights,' environmental law,3" the law of
to support... an international legal norm"); Herbert W. Briggs, Book Review, 61 AM. 1. INT'L L. 213,
214 (1967) (arguing that Restatement (Second) view of nationality of natural persons was "not supported
by international law").
22. See Oliver, supra note 20, at 3 (noting that Restatement (Third) reflects "important
developments" of previous decades).
23. Id.
24. See 1987 ASIL Panel, supra note 18, at 192 (remarks of Monroe Leigh) (noting that no
international tribunal has held in favor of reasonableness requirement and that reporters have been "too
prone ... to finding new customary international law"); id. at 188 (comments of Cecil Olmstead) (noting
that section 403's roots in international law "appear somewhat less than deep"); Cecil 1. Olmstead,
Jurisdiction, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 468, 472 (1989) (noting implausibility of claim that Restatement (Third)
section 403 has emerged as principle of international law); see also Maier, supra note 21, at 301 (noting
that if judges relied on reasonableness requirement of draft section 403 they would be incrementally
contributing to development of rule and playing role in formation of norm). Bat see Oliver, supra note 20,
at 3 (arguing that reporters were conscientious in avoiding stating customary norms not supported by
international opinion).
25. See Olmstead, supra note 24, at 471-72 (noting that Restatement (Third) formulation "appears
to exceed judicial formulations of either U.S. or foreign courts" and has minimal support). TheRestatement
(Third) provides that a state has prescriptive jurisdiction over conduct that has or is intended to have
substantial effect on U.S. territory. See RESTATEMENT (TIRD) § 402(1)(c) (emphasis added). This
formulation deviates from the generally accepted rule stated in the Restatement (Second): Jurisdiction may
be exercised over conduct that is intended to have and actually has substantial effect within a state's
territory. See RESTATEMENT (SECON) § 18 (emphasis added).
26. See W.T. Burke, Customary Law of the Sea: Advocacy or Disinterested Scholarship?, 14 YALE
J. Irrr'LL. 508, 508-09 (1989) (reviewing Restatement (Third)); see also Kenneth R. Simmonds, The Law
of the Sea, in COMMENTARIES ON THE REsTATEMENT (CHIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIoNs LAw OF THE
UNITED STATES 149, 153, 173-74 (International Lawyer ed., 1992) [hereinafter COMmENTARIES] (noting
that treatment of law of sea is inconsistent and arbitrary).
27. See Monroe Leigh, Sabbatino's Silver Anniversary and the Restatement: No Cause for
Celebration, in COMMENTARIES, supra note 26, at 95, 96-97, 102-04 (arguing that Restatement (Third)
"unjustifiably expands the doctrine"); see also Malvina Halberstam, Sabbatino Resurrected: The Act of State
Doctrine in the Revised Restatement of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 68, 90-91 (1985)
(arguing that Restatement (Third) inaccurately describes law).
28. See United States v. Stuart, 109 S.Ct. 1183, 1196 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing
Restatement (Third) endorsement of use of pre-ratification materials to interpret text of treaties as proposal
for change rather than reflection of U.S. or international law).
29. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Convergence of the Law of State Responsibility for Injury to
Aliens and International Human Rights Norms in the Revised Restatement, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 99, 121-22
(1984) (noting neutral statement of general rules on law of state responsibility for injury to aliens and wide
support for those rules); Lung-chu Chen, Protection of Persons (Natural and Juridical), 14 YALE J. INT'L
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remedies,"1 and the law 2 of foreign country money judgments-constitute
narrow and cautious statements of customary norms. There was agreement
that the Restatement (Third) would be influential-even treated as a "bible" by
judges and practitioners who are generally unfamiliar with international law and
who may find it difficult to obtain evidence of state practice and opinio juris.33
Existing Restatements of domestic law already carried considerable weight
because of the ALI's eminence and the thoroughness of its drafting process.3 4
Commentators also noted that the Restatement (Third) might contribute to the
formation of customary law, as foreign governments would rely on it when it
supported their cases and use it against the U.S. government as a statement of
U.S. practice,3" notwithstanding the Restatement (Third)'s disclaimer that it is
an independent work and does not represent the view of the U.S. government
as to its legal obligations.36
The likely influence of the Restatement (Third) magnified the importance
of its stating customary law accurately, given the ALI's claim that its document
reflected state practice and opinio juris. If the rules said to reflect custom in fact
L. 542, 552 (1989) (noting Restatement (Third)'s careful selection of short list of human rights norms);
Daniel T. Murphy, The Restatement (rhird)'s Human Rights Provisions: Nothing New, But Very Welcome,
in CommENTAR~ms, supra note 26, at 175, 178 (noting conservative statement of human rights norms with
"overwhelming" support by authorities); James A.R. Naftiger, Restating the Rights of Aliens, 25 VA. J.
INT'L L. 125, 140 (1984) (noting conservative statement of aliens' rights despite strong forces expanding
law in this area).
30. See David D. Caron, The Law of the Environment: A Smbolic Step of Modest Value, 14 YALE
J. INT'L L. 528, 528, 540 (1989) (arguing that Restatement (Third) analyzes only narrow portions of
international environmental law).
31. See Lea Brilmayer, International Remedies, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 579, 579, 589 (1989)
(criticizing Restatement (Third) for narrow, legalistic view of remedies).
32. See Werner F. Ebke & Mary E. Parker, Foreign Country Money-Judgments and Arbitral
Awards and the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States: A Conventional
Approach, in CoMmENTARms, supra note 26, at 115, 147-48 (noting Restatement's careful and conservative
statement of law).
33. See, e.g., Panel Discussion, The Draft Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States (Revised), 76 AM. SOc'Y INT'LL. Ptoc. 184, 195 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 ASIL Panel] (comments
of John Houck); see also Richard Falk, Conceptual Foundations, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 439, 441 (1989);
Maier, supra note 21, at 316; Karl M. Meessen, Foreword to Special Review Essays: The Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations of the United States, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 433, 433 (1989) (noting likely
impact of Restatement on practitioners); 1987 ASIL Panel, supra note 18, at 194 (comments of Detlev
Vagts) (noting likely influence of Restatement (Third) onjudiciary). As predicted, the Restatement (Second)
and the Restatement (Third) have been cited extensively by U.S. courts. See RESTATE ENT (THMIRD) (Supp.
1986) (cumulative case citations to both Restatements).
34. See Falk, supra note 33, at 439-41. As of March 1994, the ALI had counted over 125,000
judicial citations to its Restatements. See Abrahamson, supra note 12, at 4.
35. See 1987 ASIL Panel, supra note 18, at 186 (comments of Cecil Olmstead) (noting likely
influence of Restatement on litigation and state practice); Meessen, supra note 33, at 435; see also Rudolf
Bernhardt et al., Restatement of the Law Third: The Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 608, 609 (1992) (book review) (noting that Restatement (Third) would give lawyers in other
countries information about "prevailing American views on international law"); Karl M. Meessen, Conflicts
of Jurisdiction and the New Restatement, 50 LAw & CONTEMP. PaoBs. 47, 53 (1987) ("[Today's lex
ferenda might be tomorrow's lex lata if only due to the impact of the Restatement itself.").
36. See RESrATEMENT (D-RD) 3 (quoting and incorporating statement from Restatement (Second)
that "'[t]he positions or outlooks of particular states, including the United States, should not be confused
with what a consensus of states would accept or support'"); see also Hazard, supra note 11, at ix ("In a
number of particulars the formulations in this Restatement are at variance with positions that have been taken
by the United States government.").
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did not, practitioners would replicate serious misstatements of law. The next
two parts will examine the content of the reasonableness requirement-and to
a lesser degree the restrictions regarding the regulation of foreign
subsidiaries-and argue that it does not, in fact, reflect customary law binding
on the United States.
III. THE ORIGINS AND CONTENT OF THE REASONABLENESS REQUIREMENT
Under international law, a state is subject to limitations on its jurisdiction
to prescribe, that is, its power "to make its laws applicable to the activities,
relations, or status of persons."37 The legal regime governing the exercise of
prescriptive jurisdiction arose as a result of the development of the territorial
state in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 38 States customarily recognized
that each had absolute authority within its borders.3 1 Throughout the nineteenth
century, customary law did not permit extraterritorial prescriptions of law.'
As interstate commerce increased, states began to recognize the existence
of other bases of prescriptive jurisdiction.4 A milestone in this transformation
away from strict territorial limits was the decision of the Permanent Court of
International Justice in the Case of the S.S. Lotus,42 in which the court held that
customary law did not prohibit Turkey from asserting criminal jurisdiction over
the officers of a French ship that had collided on the high seas with a Turkish
vessel, killing several Turkish crew members.43 Rejecting the view that there
are strict territorial limits on prescriptive jurisdiction, the court recognized the
"effects" doctrine: A state may prescribe law for conduct that occurs outside
its territory but has effects within it.' The Lotus holding was quickly adopted
37. RESTATEMEN CrHRD) § 401(a).
38. See Harold G. Maier, Resolving Extraterritorial Conflicts, or "There and Back Again", 25 VA.
J. INT'L L. 7, 11 (1984).
39. See id.
40. See Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW & POL'Y
ILNT'L Bus. 1, 1, 6-20 (1992). The Supreme Court endorsed this view in American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (holding that Sherman Act jurisdiction did not extend outside U.S.
territory).
41. See Born, supra note 40, at 1, 21-54 (describing erosion of territorial limits on prescriptive
jurisdiction).
42. Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
43. Id. at 32.
44. Id. at 19-20. Lotus has also been cited for the proposition that international law permits states
to legislate extraterritorially with complete freedom, except where a specific rule restricts that freedom. See,
e.g., David H. Small, Managing Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Problems: The United States Government
Approach, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 283, 292 (1983) (citing State Department view of Lotus rule);
Maier, supra note 38, at 12 (citing Lotus for proposition that customary law does not contain general
prohibition on application of prescriptive jurisdiction to foreign activity). This argument is based on the
following passage from Lotus:
Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States may not extend the
application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property, and acts
outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is only
limited in certain cases by prohibited rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to
adopt the principles which it regards as best and most suitable.
Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19. It was not necessary for the holding in Lotus, however, for
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by other authorities.45 In 1935, the Harvard Research in International Law
Study on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime documented state practice that
recognized the effects doctrine, as well as the nationality principle, as
acceptable bases of criminal jurisdiction.46 United States courts adopted the
effects doctrine in the antitrust area beginning in 1945.41
The Restatement (Second) recognized the effects doctrine as one of the
legitimate bases for the exercise of jurisdiction.4" When two states had
jurisdictional links to the same activity, according to the Restatement (Second),
they each had one further obligation:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the rules they
may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person, each state is required
by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement
jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would
impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory o f the other
state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be expected
to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
49
This section of the Restatement (Second) is the direct precursor of
Restatement (Third) section 403. Based on developments in the law that
occurred after the publication of the Restatement (Second), the reporters of the
Restatement (Third) adopted a new, stronger rule: Whereas section 40 merely
required states to consider moderating their enforcement of laws that they were
authorized to prescribe, section 403 now defines reasonableness as "an essential
element in determining whether, as a matter of international law, the state may
exercise jurisdiction to prescribe. "5
The Restatement (Third) states two preconditions to the legal exercise of
jurisdiction. The first condition is the existence of a link between the regulating
state and the regulated activity. An example of an accepted link is territory: A
state is permitted to regulate conduct that either takes place within its territory
the court to recognize a sweeping default rule in favor of the legality of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The
court probably intended the presumption to apply only in cases such as Lotus where a clear link existed
between the forum state and the regulated activity. See A.V. Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction:
The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 257, 263 (1981).
45. See Born, supra note 40, at 25-26.
46. See Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, reprinted in 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 480, 500-03, 519
(Supp. 1935) (study by Harvard Research in International Law); see also Joseph J. Norton, Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction from a Differing Perspective: Section 416 of the Restatement (Third) and "Jurisdiction To
Regulate Activities Related to Securities", in COMMENTARiES, supra note 26, at 43 (noting Harvard Study
formed "prime basis" for Restatement (Second) position on jurisdiction).
47. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945)
(permitting application of antitrust laws to activity that has and is intended to have effects in United States).
48. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 18.
49. Id. § 40. Section 40 of the Restatement (Second) was drawn from conflicts of laws principles.
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CoNrucrs OF LAws § 6 (listing factors for balancing).
50. RESTATEMENT (THiRD) § 403 rep. note 10.
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or has, or is intended to have, a substantial effect within its territory." Another
accepted link under the Restatement (Third) is nationality: A state may regulate
the activity of its citizens who are abroad.' Where territoriality, nationality, or
another accepted link 3 is present, prescriptive jurisdiction is said to exist.
According to the Restatement (Third), customary law's second precondition
to the legitimate exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction is the reasonableness
requirement of section 403. Section 403(1) states: "Even when one of the bases
for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a state may not exercise jurisdiction to
prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connections with
another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable. "I Whether
an exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable turns on an evaluation of eight
different factors, including the closeness of the link between the regulated
activity and the regulating state, the character of the activity to be regulated,
and the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.55
Even after a state's exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction has been
determined to be reasonable under the eight factors, a final condition must be
met in cases in which another state has concurrent jurisdiction over the same
matter. In such cases, according to the Restatement (Third), "each state has an
obligation" to evaluate, in light of the relevant factors, the relative interests of
the two states.5 6 The state with the lesser interest "should defer" to the state
51. See id. § 402(1)(a)-(c). The section reads:
Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to (1) (a) conduct that,
wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory; (b) the status of persons, or
interests in things, present within its territory; (c) conduct outside its territory that has or is
intended to have substantial effect within its territory.
Id.
52. See id. § 402(2) ("Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect
to... the activities, interests, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its territory.").
53. The Restatement (Third) recognizes jurisdictional links based on conduct directed against the
security interests of a state and over conduct that is universally recognized as unlawful, such as terrorism.
See id. §§ 402(3), 404.
54. Id. § 403(1) (emphasis added).
55. See id. § 403(2). Factors to be considered under section 403(2) include, but are not limited to:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to which
the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect
upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the
regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or
between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of the regulation to the
regulating state, the extent to which other states regulated such activities, and the degree to
which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic
system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international
system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Id.
56. See id. § 403(3).
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with the greater interest." According to section 403 of the Restatement (Third),
then, in many circumstances a state must surmount three hurdles before it may
exercise prescriptive jurisdiction.
IV. WHY THE ALI's REASONABLENESS REQUIREMENT DOES NOT REFLECT
CUSTOMARY LAW
The Restatement (Third) claims that two developments in the law prompted
its adoption of the reasonableness requirement in place of Restatement (Second)
section 40. The first development was a series of protests by foreign states in
response to what were called "extravagant and exorbitant exercises of
jurisdiction."58 The second development that inspired this change was the
adoption of a "jurisdictional rule of reason" in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank
of America59 and other U.S. cases. According to Louis Henkin, chief reporter
of the Restatement (Third), the reporters "tried to combine" these two
developments "into a principle of international law which we think our courts
would accept and has a good chance of being accepted by the people abroad as
a restatement of what they are doing."6' Whether these "two developments"
formed an adequate basis for the existence of a rule of customary law will be
examined in this part.
A. Diplomatic Protests and U.S. Decisions To Moderate Jurisdiction
As evidence that the reasonableness requirement reflects state practice, the
Restatement (Third) cites examples in which European states have "questioned"
various applications of U.S. jurisdiction as "exorbitant" 61 and in which the
United States has then withdrawn or moderated the reach of the regulation to
bring its practice into line with the norm.62 In addition, as evidence that the
reasonableness standard is customary law, the Restatement (Third) notes that
legislatures in the United States and elsewhere have "generally refrained from
exercising jurisdiction where it would be unreasonable to do so. "6 These
protests, responses, and abstentions did not, however, constitute consistent state
practice, accompanied by opinio juris, in support of the reasonableness
requirement.
Diplomatic protests did not represent state practice consistent with the
57. See id.
58. See 58 A.L.I. Paoc. 262 (1981) (comments of Louis Henkin); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
236-37 (asserting that diplomatic protests against U.S. assertions of jurisdiction contributed to development
of reasonableness requirement).
59. 549 F.2d 597, 613-14 (9th Cir. 1976).
60. 58 A.L.I. PRoc. 262 (1981) (comments of Louis Henkin).
61. RESTATEMENT (THmD) § 403 rep. note 1.
62. See id. at 236 (arguing that U.S. government reduced extraterritorial reach of antitrust and
securities laws in response to diplomatic protests); id. § 414 rep. note 3 (stating that in 1970s United States
temporarily became more sensitive to objections to its assertions of jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries).
63. Id. § 403 cmt. a.
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standard because states objected to U.S. regulations on the grounds of
"exorbitance," not "unreasonableness. "6 Exorbitant is not the same as
unreasonableness; 6  all exorbitant acts are unreasonable, but not all
unreasonable acts are exorbitant. One participant in the ALI's floor debates
regarding section 403 suggested that the Restatement (Third) define
unreasonableness narrowly, as that which would "shock the expectations of the
community of nations," rather than as that which the international community
would calmly evaluate and decide to reject.' Pursuant to this suggestion, the
restators at one point considered changing "unreasonable" in a draft of section
403 to "extravagant or exorbitant"; 67 it is not clear why they did not.
Diplomatic protests of U.S. regulations, then, demonstrate only that state
practice supports a de minimis rule that "exorbitant" or "extravagant" exercises
of jurisdiction are prohibited.
Second, when European states protested U.S. exercises of jurisdiction, they
did not call for the adoption of an independent norm of reasonableness, under
which jurisdiction based on an accepted link would be evaluated in light of the
eight factors suggested by Restatement (Third) section 403(2).6s Rather, the
states argued that the United States lacked a jurisdictional nexus to the regulated
activity in the first place. As Chief Reporter Louis Henkin noted, "[t]he world
community... has not used the term reasonableness. . . . They have made
those objections, however, as a matter of interpretation of the 'effects
principle,' calling the U.S. interpretation extravagant and its application
exorbitant. "69 At most, these objections reflect a view as to how the traditional
jurisdictional links should be interpreted-that they should not be interpreted to
permit jurisdiction when the links between the regulating state and the regulated
conduct are de minimis. The U.S. government interprets the rules of
prescriptive jurisdiction in this manner. As Davis Robinson, then-Legal Adviser
of the U.S. Department of State, stated in 1983, "[i]f there is a universally
recognized prohibitive rule, it is that a state may not exercise jurisdiction over
events or persons abroad unless that state has some genuine link with those
persons or events." 70
64. See supra text accompanying note 58.
65. See Joseph J. Norton, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction from a Differing Perspective, in
COMMENTARIES, supra note 26, at 41, 58 ("It probably could be concluded that most member states would
agree that a state and its courts should not extend jurisdiction in 'exorbitant' situations. This, however, is
not the same as purporting that a 'principle of reasonableness' is to apply in all situations.").
66. See 58 A.L.I. PRoc. 253, 263 (1981) (comments of Louis B. Schwartz).
67. See 58 A.L.I. PRoc. 264, 290 (1981) (comments of Louis Henkin).
68. See supra note 55.
69. See 58 A.L.I. PRoc. 262 (1981) (comments of Louis Henlin); see also REsTATEmENT (THIRD)
§ 403 rep. note 1 ("These objections have usually been articulated in terms that sought to limit the scope
of a particular basis of jurisdiction, but they reflect the view that the bases of jurisdiction must be interpreted
and applied reasonably, and indicate a perception as to what is reasonable in particular circumstances.").
70. Davis R. Robinson, Speech Before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Feb.
14, 1984), in 2 CUMULATIvE DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1981-1988, at
1329, 1330 (1994) [hereinafter CUMIJLATivE DIGEST]; see also David H. Small, Managing Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction: The United States Government Approach, 50 LAW & CoNTEmp. PROBS. 283, 292 (1987)
(discussing U.S. government rule that only firmly established prohibitive rule of jurisdiction is "a threshold
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Finally, even if foreign states had protested U.S. exercises of jurisdiction
on the basis of a reasonableness requirement, those protests alone would not
have been sufficient to bring a new rule of customary law into being. Under
the Restatement (Third)'s own view of customary law sources, prohibitive rules
must be supported by sufficient state practice and opinio juris.Y1 To establish a
reasonableness requirement, then, there would have to be evidence of a
widespread state practice of abstention from unreasonable exercises of
jurisdiction following from a sense of legal obligation. Evidence of custom is
increasingly difficult to establish.' There is no evidence that any state has
declined to exercise jurisdiction when an accepted link existed, on the grounds
that such exercise would be unreasonable.' In the absence of such evidence,
when assertions of jurisdiction by the United States are met by protests, the
assertion and the protest "cancel each other out, with the result that no rule of
customary law comes into being."74 Without the concurrence of the United
States, a major power in the field of extraterritorial regulation, it is difficult for
a custom in this area to come into being.' At most, a particular or regional
custom might be said to have developed among the states that have consistently
abstained from unreasonable assertions of jurisdiction, based on a sense of legal
obligation.76
In cases in which Congress, U.S. courts, or agencies have acted to reduce
the reach of jurisdiction following diplomatic protests, their actions have not
been accompanied by a sense of legal obligation. When Congress, following
diplomatic protests, limited application of U.S. antitrust laws to foreign
requirement that a state have a sufficient nexus with the matter to justify an assertion of jurisdiction"). Small
was the Department of State Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic, Business, and Communication Affairs
from 1983 to 1987. See id. at 283.
71. See supra text accompanying note 8; see also Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of
InternationalLaw, 47 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 38 (1974-1975) ("In the case of rules imposing duties, it is
not enough to show that States have acted in the manner required by the alleged rule, and that other states
have acquiesced in such action. There must be statements by States that they regard such action as
obligatory, not voluntary.").
72. See 1982 ASIL Panel, supra note 33, at 185 (comments of Cecil T. Oliver) ("A true rule of
customary international law requires proof of acceptance by a heavy preponderance of states, and to
determine this in a world of increasing diversity... is difficult.").
73. See 58 A.L.I. PROc. 285 (1981) (comments of Malvina H. Guggenheim) ("A lot of states have
declined or have not exercised the jurisdiction, but I don't know of any that has said, 'We believe that under
international law we may not.'").
74. See Akehurst, supra note 71, at 39; see also id. at 37 ("States assert that something is already
a rule of international law.... If other States acquiesce, a new rule of customary law comes into being.");
Myres McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law ofthe Sea, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 356,
357-58 (describing development of customary international law of the sea as part of "process of continuous
interaction, of continuous demand and response [through which] reciprocal tolerances . . . create the
expectations of pattern and uniformity in decision, of practice in accord with rule, commonly regarded as
law").
75. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATnONAL LAW 7 (3d ed. 1991) ("[lIt is inescapable that some
states are more influential and powerful than others and that their activities should be regarded as of greater
significance.... [F9or a custom to be accepted and recognized it must have the concurrence of the major
powers in that particular field."); see also Akehurst, supra note 71, at 17 (arguing that for custom to
emerge, "[S]tate practice, including that of States whose interests are specially affected, should have been
both extensive and virtually uniform") (citation omitted).
76. See RESTATEMENT (TrID) § 102 cmts. b, e.
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commerce having a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on
U.S. commerce,77 at most it acknowledged the view that effects-based
jurisdiction should not be based on de minimis contacts. However, it did not
acknowledge an independent norm of reasonableness. Moreover, this limitation
applies only to foreign commerce other than imports.78 United States courts and
agencies applying the Sherman Act to foreign-import commerce do so on the
basis of the effects doctrine and do not independently evaluate the
reasonableness of the exercise. 9 Thus, all three branches of the U.S.
government have continued to assert jurisdiction based on the effects doctrine
notwithstanding foreign protests, and none has acknowledged the existence of
an independent reasonableness requirement.
The Restatement (Third) also suggests that the United States indicated
acquiescence to a reasonableness requirement when, in response to diplomatic
protests, it dismantled Cold War export controls that regulated the
extraterritorial conduct of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations.80 For
example, when Congress, in 1977, limited the application of the Trading with
the Enemy Act to wartime situations,8 ' it also enacted the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA),1 a sweeping act under which the
Carter administration later froze Iranian assets,83 and which reached foreign
branches of U.S. banks.' In the same act, Congress also expanded the
executive branch's power under the Export Administration Act of 1969 to
prohibit exports from any country of goods or technology exported by foreign
subsidiaries of U.S. corporations.85 The Reagan administration then relied on
the Export Administration Act to implement the pipeline regulations, which
prohibited U.S. corporations and their foreign subsidiaries from contributing
to the building of a natural-gas pipeline between Western Europe and Siberia.86
The implementation of these statutes and regulations undermines the claim that
77. See Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6(a), 45(a)(3) (1994);
see also RESTATEmENT (THIRD) § 415 cmt. b, rep. note 8 (discussing same).
78. See U.S. DEP'T OF JusrIcF & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTTrrusr ENFoRcEMENT GuIDENEs FOR
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 12 (1995) [hereinafter ANTITRUST GUIDE!NES].
79. See id. at 12 (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993) (holding
that "Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and that did in fact produce some
substantial effect in the United States')).
80. See REsTATEmENT (TiamD) § 414 rep. note 3; see also id. § 414 rep. note 4.
81. Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, tit. I, 91 Stat. 1625 (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1994)); see also RESTATEmENT (IRmD) § 414 rep. note 3.
82. Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, tit. II, 91 Stat. 1625, 1626 (codified as amended
at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1994)).
83. See Exec. Order No. 12,205, 3 C.F.R. 248 (1980), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 app. at 191
(1994); Exec. Order No. 12,211, 3 C.F.R. 253 (1980) (revoked 1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 app.
at 191 (1994); see also John Ellicott, Extraterritorial Trade Controls-Law, Policy, and Business, in
PRIvATE INvESToRS ABROAD-PROnLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 1, 4 (1983).
84. See Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. 535.329 (1980); see also RESTATEmENT
(rHD) § 414 rep. notes 4, 7.
85. See Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, tit. III, 91 Stat. 1625, 1629; see also Ellicott,
supra note 83, at 5-6.
86. See 47 Fed. Reg. 27,250-52 (1982); RESTATEMENT CTrD) § 414 rep. note 8; CASTE, supra
note 1, at 159-61.
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in the 1970s the United States began to acquiesce to a new norm restricting
prescriptive jurisdiction.
The pipeline regulations were themselves withdrawn after European states
protested their legality.' However, as in other cases in which the United States
withdrew or scaled back assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the changes
resulted largely from political and diplomatic considerations and were not
accompanied by a sense of legal obligation.88 In response to the protests,
Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam stated that "this government took the
same position that administration after administration, and Congress after
Congress, have taken-namely, that the relationship between a parent and a
subsidiary... justifies the assertion of American jurisdiction when substantial
American interests are involved."89 Soon after the pipeline regulations were
withdrawn, Congress reenacted the Export Administration Act with the same
authority to regulate foreign subsidiaries that European states had protested.90
Recently Congress has extended the reach of the Cuban embargo to cover
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations9' and enacted new sanctions that reach
any firm "trafficking" in confiscated property claimed by U.S. nationals.'
Finally, there is nothing to suggest that states agree on how a multiple
factor test would be used to determine reasonableness. For the reasonableness
requirement as drafted by the ALI to become customary international law would
require the development of a significant body of state practice demonstrating
how courts and executive branches actually weigh the eight factors that
constitute the standard. One member of the ALI's International Advisory Panel
for the Restatement (Third), Karl M. Meessen, has argued that the range of
factors to be considered under section 403 is so long, and the state practice is
so divergent, that "no chance exists" that the Restatement (Third) formulation
87. See R.STATEMENT ('m) § 414 rep. note 8; see also European Communities, Comments on
the U.S. Regulations Concerning Trade with the U.S.S.R., reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 891 (1982) (protesting
pipeline regulations); United Kingdom, Statement and Order Concerning the American Export Embargo with
Regard to the Soviet Gas Pipeline, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 851 (1982).
88. See 63 A.L.I. PRoc. 100 (comments of David Small); see also 63 A.L.I. PRoc. 103 (comments
of Bennett Boskey, adviser to Restatement (Third)) ("There were so many reasons why the United States
should have withdrawn from [imposing the pipeline sanctions] that it doesn't seem that it's fair to allocate
it to an international law obligation.").
89. Kenneth W. Dam, Address Before the American Society of International Law (Apr. 15, 1983),
in 2 CuMu.ATrCE DiGSr, supra note 70, at 1323, 1325); see also Small, supra note 70, at 292 (providing
U.S. Department of State view that ownership and control of corporation are examples of "other real ties
that support limited exercises of jurisdiction").
90. See 63 A.L.I. PRoc. 100 (comments of David Small); see also John Ellicott, From Pipeline to
Panama-the Evolution of Extraterritorial Trade and Financial Controls, in PRIVATE Ir EsTORS
AEROAD-PROBLEMS AND SOLTrIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BusINESS, supra note 83, at 7-1, 7-16 (noting
failure of Congress to curtail executive power under Export Administration Act after pipeline controversy);
cf Export Administration Amendment Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-64, 99 Stat. 120 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
App. § 2405 (1994)).
91. Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2575 (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6005(a)(1) (1994)) (prohibiting transaction between Cuba and U.S.-owned or U.S.-controlled foreign
firms, as defined by 31 C.F.R. § 515.559 (1996)).
92. See 22 U.S.C. § 6023 (1997).
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could become customary law. 93
Even if the reasonableness requirement could be said to have emerged as
customary law, it would not be binding on the United States. Under the
persistent objector principle, a state that clearly indicates its rejection of an
emerging rule is not bound by it.' The United States consistently has stated its
position that the only international legal limit on the exercise of prescriptive
jurisdiction is the existence of a genuine linkY5 Then-Legal Adviser Robinson
stated in 1983 that the reasonableness requirement "does not accurately reflect
the state of international law." 91 To reflect customary law binding on the
United States accurately, the Restatement (Third) should acknowledge such
persistent objections to the emergence of a reasonableness requirement.
The Restatement (Third) should also acknowledge that the United States has
persistently objected to the rule that a state may exercise jurisdiction over
foreign subsidiaries of corporations registered under its laws only in
"exceptional cases."I The restriction derives from the Restatement's view that
corporate nationality is determined by the place of incorporation. 98 There is
ample basis in international law, however, for a state to regard ownership and
control by its citizens as a basis of corporate nationality. 99 State practice is not
93. Meessen, supra note 35, at 59; see also Norton, supra note 65, at 59 (concluding that
reasonableness requirement cannot be viewed as "rule" formed through consensus of states but is "a
discretionary approach to be taken by an enlightened legislature or judiciary").
94. See RESTATmmT (TrRD) § 102 cmt. d (defining persistent objector as "a state that indicates
its dissent from a practice while the law is still in the process of development [and therefore] is not bound
by that rule even after it matures"); Jonathan I. Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development
of Customary International Law, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1985) ("[V]irtually all authorities maintain
that a State which objects to an evolving rule of general customary international law can be exempted from
its obligations."); Ted L. Stein, The Approach of a Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent
Objector in International Law, 26 HARv. INT'L L.J. 457, 458 (1995) ("A state that has persistently objected
to a rule is not bound by it, so long as the objection was made manifest during the process of the rule's
emergence.").
95. See supra text accompanying note 70.
96. Davis R. Robinson, Conflicts of Jurisdiction and the Draft Restatement, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 1147, 1152 (1983); see also Dam, supra note 89, at 1325 (noting that Department of State was "not
altogether satisfied with making a balancing test the prerequisite to the etistence of jurisdiction"). The U.S.
government generally does not support the development of a reasonableness requirement; rather, it views
the existence of any basis for jurisdiction as legally sufficient. See UNrIED STATES ECONOMIC MEASURES
AoAINsT CUBA 223-24 (Michael Krinsky & David Golove eds., 1993).
97. See RESTATEMENT C1TRD) § 414(2)(b).
98. See id. § 213.
99. International law allows a state to consider a corporation as its national under three different
conditions: (1) if the corporation is established under its law; (2) if it has its center of management or
exploitation there; or (3) if it is controlled by shaieholders who are its nationals. See 1 GEORG
SCHWARTZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 389, 393, 411 (3d ed. 1957); IGNAZ SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN,
CORPORAIONs iN AND UNDER INrERNATIONAL LAw 8 (1987); see also J. Mervyn Jones, Claims on Behalf
of Nationals Who Are Shareholders in Foreign Companies, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 225, 237, 251 (1949)
(noting that substantial body of evidence supports control-based test of corporate nationality); Herman
Walker Jr., Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial Treaties, 50 AM. J. Irr'L L. 373, 381
(1956) (noting that the control theory sometimes had been favored in projected multilateral conventions and
treaties dealing with foreign corporations).
The Barcelona Traction Case, in which the International Court of Justice held that a state representing
the controlling shareholders of a corporation lacked standing to assert diplomatic protection on their behalf
where the state of incorporation could assert diplomatic protection, casts doubt on the control-based test of
corporate nationality. See Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4
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consistent enough to support the existence of a rule that the place of
incorporation is the principal basis for the determination of nationality. 00 The
United States has adopted a control test in several situations, intervening
diplomatically on behalf of national shareholders for the protection of property
interests in foreign-incorporated entities. 10 1 The Restatement (Second) permitted
states to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over corporations owned or controlled
by their nationals."r2 Further, no U.S. court has ever invalidated an
extraterritorial regulation adopted for national security reasons on the grounds
stated in Restatement (Third) section 4 14 .1° According to the Restatement
(Third), Canada and several European states have regulated the overseas
activities of their foreign subsidiaries in certain circumstances.l14 Accordingly,
commentators have argued that Restatement (Third) section 414 does not reflect
customary law. 1°5 In any case, the United States government has persistently
objected to the emergence of such a rule.
B. Applications of the Reasonableness Requirement by U.S. Courts
The second basis from which the Restatement (Third) derived the
reasonableness requirement was a series of decisions in which U.S. courts
purportedly adopted the standard from a sense of legal obligation."°' Although
several U.S. courts have applied multifactor tests to determine whether the
exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable, this state practice was not
(Judgment of Feb. 5); Stanley J. Marcuss & Eric L. Richard, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in United States
Trade Law: The Need for a Consistent Theory, 20 CoLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 439, 457 (1981). The court
acknowledged, however, that no test had found general acceptance, leaving room for argument that the
control-based test is permissible in other circumstances. See id. at 457.
100. See, e.g., William Laurence Craig, Application of the Trading with the Enemy Act to Foreign
Corporations Owned by Americans: Reflections on Fruehauf v. Massardy, 83 HARV. L. REV. 579, 589-90
(1970) (stating that international law principles for determining nationality of corporations are "unsettled");
Robert B. Thompson, United States Jurisdiction over Foreign Subsidiaries: Corporate and International I.av
Aspects, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 319, 362, 374, 377 (1983) (noting little evidence of consensus among
states of separateness of corporation as rule of international law); Sigmund Timberg, Corporate Fictions:
Logical, Social and International Implications, 46 CoLUM. L. REv. 533, 572 (1946) (noting "confusion and
uncertainty" regarding nationality of corporations under international law).
101. See Jones, supra note 99, at 229-31, 257-58 (discussing U.S. diplomatic intervention on behalf
of U.S. owners of enterprises incorporated in Portugal and Mexico).
102. See REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) § 27 cmt. d.
103. See Stanley J. Marcuss, Jurisdiction with Respect to Foreign Branches and Subsidiaries: Judicial
Power in the Foreign Affairs Context Under Section 414 of the Foreign Relations Restatement, in
CoMMENTARms, supra note 26, at 21-22.
104. See RFSTAMENT (TIHID) § 414 rep. note 2.
105. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Business: Regulation and Protection, 78 HARv. L.
Ray. 1699, 1705 (1965) (book review) (noting that "there is little substance" to charge that U.S.
extraterritorial regulation of foreign subsidiaries violated international law); Marcuss, supra note 103, at
34 (stating that Restatement (hird) § 414 represents "prescription... of what the law might or should be
in the future").
106. See RasralTmA qrO'Nr Da) § 403 rep. note 2 (citing IImberlane Lunber Co. for proposition that
"[s]ome courts have addressed [U.S. jurisdiction to prescribe] from the point of view of 'comity,' but seen
as a matter of obligation among states"); Id. at 231 (stating that its rules governing prescriptive jurisdiction,
including reasonableness requirement, "reflect development in the law as given effect by U.S. courts" and
noting that "[tihe courts appear to have considered these rules as a blend of international law and domestic
law, including international 'comity' as part of that law").
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accompanied by opinio juris.
In the 1970s, several U.S. courts converted the list of factors in
Restatement (Second) into a balancing test to determine whether jurisdiction
existing under accepted links such as territoriality should be exercised. 1°7 The
seminal example was the Ninth Circuit Timberlane case of 1976.108 In
Timberlane, a U.S. corporation operating a lumber company in Honduras
sought enforcement of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act against several U.S.
corporations for allegedly conspiring to eliminate the plaintiff from the
Honduran lumber market."° Because Honduran law permitted the defendant's
allegedly anticompetitive practices,' both the United States and Honduras had
credible claims to exercise jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit held that in such a
case of concurrent jurisdiction, court approval of an exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction would require not only the finding of a sufficient nexus between the
United States and the regulated activity but also the examination of the
competing interests of the states exercising jurisdiction under a "jurisdictional
rule of reason."1' By balancing a list of factors, the court would determine
"whether American authority [existing under a link such as territoriality] should
be asserted in a given case. "112 This two-step approach-a determination of
whether a jurisdictional link exists followed by an evaluation of multiple factors
to determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction would be
unreasonable-served as the model for sections 402 and 403 of the Restatement
(Third).
Thus Timberlane and other cases adopting a similar approach, such as
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp. , could be cited as U.S. state
practice in support of the reasonableness requirement. An issue of critical
importance for the Restatement (Third), however, was whether these courts
adopted the rule based on international legal obligation or discretionary
comity." 4 In fact, the Timberlane court describes its jurisdictional "rule of
reason" as a "matter of international comity and fairness," and not as a matter
of obligation under international law." 5 The Third Circuit in Mannington Mills
107. See Maer, supra note 38, at 16 & n.33 (citing cases that adopted balancing test to determine
whether jurisdiction based on accepted link should be exercised).
108. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
109. See id. at 600-01.
110. See id. at 604.
111. See id. at613.
112. See id.
113. 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979).
114. There is no bright line distinguishing comity and legal obligation. See RESTATEmEN (ThIRD)
§ 101 cmt. e ("Comity, in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor
of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other." (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895)).
Traditionally in the Anglo-American legal system, however, the extension of comity is distinguishable in
that it is considered a unilateral, discretionary act of the forum, not a matter of obligation under customary
international law. See Maier, supra note 21, at 281.
115. See 7lmberlane Lumber Co., 549 F.2d at 615. The Restatement (Third) reporters concede that
the limberlane rule derives from comity, but they attempt to convert comity into a legal obligation. See
RESTATEMENT (rBM) § 403 cmt. a (arguing that U.S. courts applying principle of reasonableness have
done so as matter of comity but have simultaneously viewed application of rule as matter of international
law).
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also did not claim that the standard it adopted was based on international law." 6
A number of authorities agree with this reading of these cases."17 In an
unguarded moment, even Louis Henkin described the courts' uses of the
standard as discretionary.18 The D.C. Circuit, in Laker Airways Ltd. v.
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines,"9 rejected the Timberlane and Restatement
(Third) section 403 approach outright," ° in part because it found "no evidence"
that they represented international law.' At the time the Restatement (Third)
was published, then, there were no cases that applied the reasonableness
requirement based on a sense of international legal obligation.
After the Restatement (Third) was published, the Supreme Court in
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California in essence rejected the view that the
reasonableness requirement reflects customary law by holding that when effects
on U.S. commerce are established, U.S. courts should decline to apply the
Sherman Act only when there is a "true conflict between domestic and foreign
law"-where a foreign state having concurrent jurisdiction over the matter
actually compels conduct prohibited by U.S. law." In Hartford Fire, several
U.S. states and private parties sued domestic and foreign reinsurers alleging
conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act to restrict coverage terms of general
liability insurance available in the United States. 12 The case required the court
to decide whether Congress intended to apply the Sherman Act extraterritorially
under these facts."M In such cases, Congress is presumed to have intended not
to violate international law."z The majority opinion declined to apply the
116. See 595 F.2d at 1297-98.
117. See, e.g., CAstEL, supra note 1, at 58 ("Mhe test adopted by the [Timberlane] court does not
derive from . . . international law."); Harold G. Maier, The Authoritative Sources of Customary
InternationalLaw in the United States, 10 MIcH. J. INT'LL. 450, 465 (1989) (same); Maier, supra note 38,
at 16 ("Courts interpreting Section 40 treated it not as a rule of law but as a prescription for a mode of
decisionmaking designed to alleviate tension among nations."); Cecil J. Olmstead, Jurisdiction, 14 YALE
J. INT'L L. 468, 473 (1989) (reviewing Restatement (Third) and noting that Timberlane holding followed
discretionary interest balancing of Restatement (Second) § 40).
118. See 58 A.L.I. PROC. 262 (1981) (comments of Chief Reporter Louis Henkin) (noting that U.S.
courts "apply the principle of reasonableness voluntarily, as a matter of comity, and on condition of
reciprocity").
119. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In Laker, a British airline sued to enjoin several U.S. and
European air carriers' anticompetitive practices. After several defendants obtained injunctions in British
courts against the plaintiffs' continuing their suit in the United States, the plaintiffs sought an injunction
prohibiting the remaining defendants from seeking similar injunctions. Id. at 916-21.
120. See id. at 948.
121. See id. at 950.
122. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798 (1993); see also Philip R. Trimble,
Comment, The Supreme Court and International Law: The Demise of Restatement Section 403, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 53, 54-55 (1995). The current Department of Justice Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines cite the
Hartford Fire holding to support the U.S. government view that interest balancing is a discretionary matter
of comity. ANT rusT GuD-aruq, supra note 78, at 21.
123. See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 769-79.
124. See id. at 812-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
125. See id. at 814-15 (stating that "statutes should not be interpreted to regulate foreign persons or
conduct if that regulation would conflict with principles of international law"). Justice Scalia relied on
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (Marshall, C.J.) ("[An] act of
congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains.").
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reasonableness requirement as the applicable international law and therefore
rejected the view, argued by Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion, that the
Restatement (Third) accurately represented the applicable customary law. 1"
Because he relied on the Restatement (Third) for the formulation of customary
law, he "got the law wrong."127 Scalia's dissent demonstrates that the
Restatement (Third) could indeed influence judges. The next part documents
further evidence of that influence.
V. THE INFLuENCE OF THE REsTATEMENT (THIRD)
Even though the Restatement (Third)'s reasonableness requirement did not
accurately reflect customary law when it was published, it has been cited as
such by U.S. courts, the U.S. Department of State, and legal scholars. This part
examines the influence of the Restatement (Third) in these areas and concludes
that the Restatement (Third) has thereby contributed to the development of a
reasonableness norm.
A. Post-Hartford Fire Citations of Section 403 by U.S. Courts
Despite Hartford Fire's rejection of the view that the reasonableness
requirement is customary law, several U.S. courts have continued to apply the
standard as though it were. These cases therefore constitute examples of state
practice accompanied by the opinio juris that was missing from Timberlane and
Mannington Mills.
In the first case, United States v. Vasquez-Valesco, the Ninth Circuit in
1994 applied the reasonableness requirement to determine whether
extraterritorial application of a criminal statute was reasonable under
international law." A defendant found to have participated in the murders of
two tourists in Mexico was convicted on two counts of committing violent
crimes in aid of a racketeering enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959. The
defendant argued on appeal that the district court erred in ruling that section
1959 applied extraterritorially.129 To determine whether the statute applied
extraterritorially, the court applied the presumption that Congress intends not
to violate international law. 130 To determine the relevant content of international
law, the court cited section 403 and applied the reasonableness requirement:
"[A]n exercise of jurisdiction on one of these bases [such as territoriality] still
violates international principles if it is 'unreasonable. '"131 Leaving no doubt that
126. See 509 U.S. at 818-19 (Scalla, J., dissenting) ("I shall rely on the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law [including § 403] for the relevant principles of international law."); see also Trimble,
supra note 122, at 54-55.
127. See Trimble, supra note 122, at 54.
128. See 15 F.3d 833, 840-41 (9th Cir. 1994).
129. See id. at 838.
130. See id. at 839.
131. See id. at 840. The court also applied the factors of section 403(2) to determine reasonability.
See id. at 840 n.6; cf. United States v. Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d 1200, 1204 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that
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it viewed the application of the reasonableness requirement as an international
legal obligation and not as a discretionary act of comity, the court then cited the
Restatement (Third)'s claim that section 403 "'has emerged as a principle of
international law.'"1 The court ultimately held that extraterritorial application
of the criminal statute was "reasonable under international law principles.""'
The Ninth Circuit's erroneous application of the reasonableness requirement as
international law probably did not affect the outcome of the case. Strictly
speaking, Hartford Fire was distinguishable because it was an antitrust case, but
the relevance of international law to statutory interpretation was the same in
both cases. Thus, the Ninth Circuit ignored a Supreme Court opinion rejecting
the reasonableness requirement and instead followed Restatement (Third)
section 403.'1 In 1997, a district court in Vermont also cited Restatement
(Third) section 403 for the proposition that under international law, exercises
of jurisdiction must be reasonable. 1 35
Two recent cases have even cited the dissent in Hartford Fire for the
proposition that the reasonableness requirement constitutes customary law. In
In re Maxwell Communication Corp., P.L.C.,3 a bankruptcy court had to
decide whether to apply the Bankruptcy Code extraterritorially.137 The court
drew from Scalia's dissent and Restatement (Third) section 403 for the
international law principle that the exercises of jurisdiction must not be
unreasonable, as determined by the multiple factors of section 403.138 Similarly,
in Neely v. Club Med Management Services, Inc., the Third Circuit cited
Justice Scalia's Hartford Fire dissent and relied on the Restatement (Third) for
the international law principle that exercises of jurisdiction must be
reasonable." 9 Other courts, of course, have applied Hartford Fire correctly. 40
In re Maxwell and Neely, however, demonstrate that judges will not merely cite
the Restatement (Third) but will rely on it for a view of international law that
"courts generally look to international law principles to ensure that an extraterritorial application of United
States laws is 'reasonable.'").
132. See 15 F.3d at 840 (citing Restatement (Third) section 403 cmt. a).
133. See id. at 841.
134. The Ninth Circuit repeated this error in United States v. Juda, 46 F.3d 961,967 (9th Cir. 1995),
in which the court looked to international law principles to ensure that extraterritorial application of U.S.
law was reasonable.
135. See United States v. Greer, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2216, at *13 (D. Vt. Feb. 18, 1997). Other
opinions that have cited the reasonableness requirement as a principle of international law include United
States v. Javino, 960 F.2d 1137, 1142-43 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying rule that "[Congress] may not
regulate... conduct 'when the exercise of ... jurisdiction is unreasonable' and applying Restatement
(Third) section 403(2) factors to determine that extraterritorial application of the statute in question "would
likely be ruled unreasonable") and Boureslan v. ARAMCO, 857 F.2d 1014, 1024-26 (5th Cir. 1988) (King,
J., dissenting).
136. 170 B.R. 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
137. See id. at 814. As in Hartford Fire, the court applied the principle that Congress is presumed
to have intended not to violate international law. See id.
138. See id. at 815.
139. See Neely v. Club Med Management Servs., Inc., 63 F.3d 166, 183-87 (3d Cir. 1995).
140. See, e.g., United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 1997 U.S. App. Lexis 4939, at *24-*25
(Ist Cir. Mar. 17, 1997) (applying Hartford Fire holding that comity concerns defeat exercise ofjurisdiction
only in rare cases of foreign sovereign compulsion).
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lacks support and that has been rejected by the Supreme Court. The Restatement
(Third) has outlived Hartford Fire. United States practice, accompanied by
opinio juris, now exists in support of the norm.
141
B. Citation of the Reasonableness Requirement by the U.S. Government
A more striking example of the Restatement (Third)'s influence is that the
U.S. State Department, which generally has not supported the development of
a reasonableness requirement, 42 has now cited the reasonableness requirement
as a rule of international law. In communications with Congress prior to the
passage of the Helms-Burton Act, the State Department Legal Adviser's Office
argued in opposition to its extraterritorial provisions that "international
law ... requires a state to apply its laws to extra-territorial conduct only when
doing so would be reasonable in view of certain customary factors."" The
memorandum does not specifically cite the Restatement (Third), but the reliance
on section 403 is unmistakable.
After U.S. trading partners protested the legality of the Act, the Clinton
administration suspended the extraterritorial property rights provision
indefinitely'" and promised to lobby Congress to make the visa-denial provision
of the statute discretionary.'45 Because these decisions to moderate the exercise
of jurisdiction followed diplomatic protests, they could be interpreted as state
practice consistent with section 403. But unlike earlier cases such as the
pipeline controversy, in which the decision to moderate jurisdiction was not
accompanied by opinio juris, this time the State Department was on record
stating its view that the reasonableness requirement is an element of
international law.
This citation of the reasonableness requirement by the Legal Adviser's
Office, however, does not constitute opinio juris because it did not reflect the
official position of the government. The memorandum was intended for an
intragovernmental policymaking audience rather than for other states and
probably was not intended for public dissemination. What is noteworthy,
however, is that the international law experts in the Legal Adviser's Office
relied on the reasonableness requirement and were apparently unaware that the
141. U.S. courts have also cited the Restatement (Third)'s expansive formulation of the effects
doctrine, notwithstanding the argument, see supra Part IV, that the formulation does not reflect customary
law. See, e.g., United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 168-69 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing "new doctrine"
that international law permits jurisdiction over conduct where intended effects, and not actual effects, are
proven); United States v. Evans, 667 F. Supp. 974, 980-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing Restatement (Second)
section 402 rule that state may exercise jurisdiction when effect or intended effect is substantial and exercise
of jurisdiction is reasonable).
142. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
143. See DEPARTMENT OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
REGARDING TITLE El OF THE LBERTAD BILL, reprinted in 141 CoNG. REc. S15106 (daily ed. Oct. 12,
1995).
144. See Steven Lee Myers, One Key Element in Anti-Cuba Law PostponedAgain, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan.
4, 1997, at 1.
145. See R.W. Apple, Jr., Split over Cuba Is Eased by U.S. and Europeans, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 12,
1997, at 1.
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State Department previously had rejected it, just as several U.S. courts relied
on it notwithstanding Hartford Fire. The Restatement (Third) section 403 has
taken on a life of its own.
146
C. Citations of Section 403 in Academic Literature
The Restatement (Third) also has been cited by numerous legal scholars as
a rule of customary international law. As noted below, these academic writings
contribute to the development of customary law. 147
A clear example of the influence of the Restatement (Third) on scholarship
may be found in J.G. Castel's work on extraterritoriality, where he cites section
403 for the proposition that a reasonableness requirement has emerged in
customary law.' 48 Other commentators have cited the Restatement (Third)
section 403 as an authoritative statement of customary law. 149 Extraterritorial
U.S. regulations such as the pipeline regulations have been criticized on the
grounds that they violate section 403.150 The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992,
as well as the Helms-Burton Act, have been similarly criticized as violating
sections of the Restatement (Third). 15 Here again, the Restatement (Third) has
146. Proponents of the Helms-Burton Act also cited the reasonableness requirement. A private
lawyer testifying in favor of the Act "reviewed" the Act in light of the factors listed in § 403(2) and
concluded that "the current situation . . . weigh[s] in favor of enacting the bill." Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on W. Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs of
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 104th Cong. 129, 136, quoted in Andreas F. Lowenfeld, 7he
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 419, 431 n.62 (1996).
The Helms-Burton Act also intentionally derived its formulation of effects-based jurisdiction from the
Restatement (Third)'s expansive formulation of that rule. See id. at 430-31 & n.61. Thus, the Restatement
(Third) formulation of the effects doctrine, which departed from accepted custom, see supra note 25 and
accompanying text, proved influential on U.S. courts and Congress.
147. See infra text accompanying notes 161-63.
148. See CA=, supra note 1, at 24-25.
149. See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL & WILLAM M. KNIGHTON, NATIONAL LAWS AND
INTERNATIONAL COMMERcE 58 (1982) (citing Restatement (Third) section 403 against U.S. regulation of
foreign subsidiaries); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Interdisciplinary Approaches to International Economic Law:
Liberal International Relations Theory and International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
717, 732-33 (1995) (arguing that customary test of jurisdiction has "evolved into" that of Restatement
(Third) sections 402 and 403).
150. See, e.g., Ellicott, supra note 83, at 24. Critics also have cited the Restatement (Third) to argue
that the pipeline unlawfully regulated foreign subsidiaries, see id. at 24; Note, Extraterritorial Subsidiary
Jurisdiction, 50 LAw & CoNT. PRoas. 71, 78-81 (1987), notwithstanding the argument that ownership
by U.S. interests constitutes a legitimate basis for the exercise of jurisdiction on the grounds of corporate
nationality.
151. Critics of the Cuban Democracy Act have cited both the reasonableness requirement and sections
231 and 414 of the Restatement (Third), which limit the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries.
See, e.g., Jason S. Bell, Comment, Violation of International Law and Doomed U.S. Policy: An Analysis
ofthe Cuban Democracy Act, 25 INTER-AM. L. REv. 77, 118 (1993) (applying Restatement (Third) sections
414, 403, and 213 to argue that Act is "unreasonable under international law"); Harold G. Maier,
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the Cuban Democracy Act, 8 FLA. J. INT'L L. 391, 393 n.1 1, 394 & n.21,
397 (1993) (citing Restatement (Third) sections 403 and 414 in support of proposition that Act violates
international law); Allen DeLoach Stewart, Comment, New World Ordered: The Asserted Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 53 Louis. L. Rsv. 1389, 1394-99 (1993) (applying
Restatement (Third) sections 213 and 414 to argue against legality of Cuban Democracy Act); Manfred
Wolf, Hitting the Wrong Guys: External Consequences of the Cuban Democracy Act, 8 FLA. J. INT'L L. 415,
418-19 (1993) (arguing that Cuban Democracy Act violates reasonableness requirement); Julia Herd, Note,
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proven influential on a group of experts with access to primary evidence of state
practice and skill in identifying opinio juris. If the many international legal
scholars reading the Restatement (Third) do not research the underlying
customary law, general practitioners and judges can hardly be expected to do
SO.
D. Motives for the ALI's Cultivation of the Reasonableness Requirement
Why did the restators deviate from customary law in stating that the
reasonableness requirement is law despite the strong evidence against its
existence? One possibility is that lawyers representing commercial interests
might have lobbied the ALI for rules that would limit the reach of U.S. antitrust
and export control law, just as they did during the drafting of the Restatement
(Second)."' There is no evidence that such lobbying took place during the
drafting of the Restatement (Third), however.153
A more likely explanation is that the reporters chiefly responsible for the
drafting of the Restatement (Third), Louis Henkin and Andreas Lowenfeld,
viewed their demanding work on the Restatement (Third) as an opportunity to
promote desirable change in the law."M Commentators have noted, for example,
that the reasonableness requirement drew heavily from a series of lectures by
Andreas Lowenfeld, 155 in which he argued that international law prohibits
unreasonable exercises of jurisdiction, as determined by a list of factors similar
to those in section 403(2). 156 Louis Henkin also personally favored a restrictive
rule. 5 7 At one point during the ALI's floor debate regarding section 403,
Henkin defended his view of section 403 by noting he had been "teaching it for
twenty five years."' One adviser to the reporters, Harold Maier, noted that it
was unavoidable that restators would seek to move the law a little: "It is neither
The Cuban Democracy Act: Another Extrateritorial Act That Won't Work, 20 BRooK. J. INT'L L. 397, 407
n.49 (1994); id. at 413 n.70 (citing Restatement (Third) section 403); id. at 419 & n.96 (citing Restatement
(Third) sections 213 and 414 cmt. e).
For discussion of the Helms-Burton Act, see Lowenfeld, supra note 146, at 431 (arguing that Helms-
Burton Act violates Restatement (Third) section 403 and therefore is inconsistent with international law).
152. See Metzger, supra note 21, at 16 (noting that, during drafting process of Restatement (Second),
lawyers representing commercial interests lobbied first to defeat, and then to moderate, effects jurisdiction).
153. See generally 1987 ASIL Panel, supra note 18; 1982 ASIL Panel, supra note 33.
154. There is evidence that the reporters viewed international order as a desirable end of international
law. See RESTATEMENT (THmRD) § 103 cmt. a ("A determination as to whether a customary rule has
developed is likely to be influenced by assessment as to whether the rule will contribute to international
order.").
155. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Public Law in the International Arena: Conflict of Laws,
International Law, and Some Suggestions for Their Interaction, 163 RECuEm DES CouRs 311 (1979).
156. See Maier, supra note 38, at 18 (noting that Lowenfeld was "intellectual father" of section 403);
62 A.L.I. PRoc. 407 (1985) (comments of Karl Meessen) (noting that subsections 403(1)-(2) "subscribe to
a theory of reasonableness that has been laid down admirably by Andreas Lowenfeld in his Hague lectures
and that... has no foundation in international law"); see also RESTATEMENT (HInD) 237 (citing Lowenfeld
lectures). See generally Lowenfeld, supra note 155.
157. See 62 A.L.I. PRoc. 403 (1985) (comment of Louis Henkin).
158. See id. (defending Restatement (Second) approach that rejected U.S. Department of State's
position).
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possible nor wise, I think, for any self-respecting academic to undertake a task
of 'restating' without making at least some attempt to 'improve' the law during
that process. "159 Another reviewer openly commended the restators for
formulating the reasonableness requirement despite its lack of acceptance in
customary law because doing so would help change the law. "[I]f one asserts
a point strongly and often enough," the reviewer noted, "the point tends to
become externally accepted or at least taken seriously." 60
The restators were well aware of their potential influence. The considered
writings of scholars are, under article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, "subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law."161
The Restatement (Third) cites this principle in its section on sources of
international law;'62 the reporters self-consciously added that "[s]uch writings
include... systematic scholarly presentations of international law such as this
Restatement.""3 By "restating" the reasonableness requirement in black letter,
the reporters hoped to shift the law in that direction.
It would be unreasonable, of course, to expect a black letter Restatement
to capture perfectly the evolving normative system of customary law. It has
become increasingly difficult to identify what customary law is and what it is
in the process of becoming." As Herbert Weschler noted, restators, like
judges, are inevitably influenced by their view of what the law should be when
they state existing law. 65
There is, however, a flaw in the analogy between restators and judges.
Judges cannot separate their vision of the "ought" from the "is" because often
they must apply existing law to new sets of facts not contemplated by the
existing law; their vision of what the law should be helps fill those gaps." The
restators, however, do not apply rules to particular sets of facts and therefore
are not obliged to fill gaps. They draft against a blank slate; any expansion of
159. 1987 ASIL Panel, supra note 18, at 181 (comments of Harold Maer). Other commentators
noted this tendency. Karl Meessen, an international consultant to the Restatement (Third), noted that
"[reporters and other restators... are human beings. All their frustrations are best rewarded if they can
be acknowledged as having moved the law a little ahead toward more fairness and justice. Such efforts have
been undertaken throughout the Restatement, although with varying intensity." Meessen, supra note 33, at
437. As Monroe Leigh noted:
The very process [of customary law creation] offers temptations to the aficionados of
international law ... to yield to an addiction peculiar to their profession, the addiction of
declaring that a favorite proposition of law has now become customary international law and
is therefore binding on everybody. Especially if the favorite proposition is close to the goal line
of acceptance, international lawyers ... even in restatements such as this, find it difficult to
resist the temptation to nudge that favorite proposition across the goal line and into the end zone
of customary international law.
1987 ASIL Panel, supra note 18, at 191 (comments of Monroe Leigh).
160. Norton, supra note 65, at 57; see also Maier, supra note 21.
161. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38(I)(d), reprinted in IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (4th ed. 1990).
162. See RESTATEMENT (TUiD) § 103(2)(c).
163. RESTATEMENT (THR) § 103 rep. note 1.
164. See, e.g., Robert Y. Jennings, What Is International Law and How Do We Tell It When We See
It?, 37 ANNUAiRE SUISSE DE DRorr INT'L 59, 67 (1981).
165. See supra text accompanying note 17.
166. Cf. BENjAMIN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 129 (1921).
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the law is gratuitous. As long as the Restatements claim to mirror existing law,
they should limit their rules to those that are supported by widespread state
practice accompanied by opinio juris, especially for crucial jurisdiction
provisions such as Restatement (Third) section 403. Furthermore, not all
scholars agree that it is inherently difficult to state what the law is. Some argue
emphatically that the reporters can and should "differentiate clearly what the
law is at the time of writing from what the developing tendencies appear to be,
and from what the reporters think the law or such tendencies ought to be."167
The usefulness of the entire Restatement diminishes when the accuracy of one
of its key sections is called into question. Judges and practitioners who rely on
the Restatement because of its user-friendliness will do so only as long as they
perceive that it is authoritative.
A further argument against the use of the Restatement forum to promote the
reasonableness requirement is that the standard itself is not desirable. First, the
widespread adoption of a reasonableness requirement by U.S. courts would
introduce a procedurally complicated hurdle to the exercise of jurisdiction.
161
Defendants in any case involving the extraterritorial application of U.S. law
could challenge the exercise of jurisdiction as unreasonable; the reasonableness
requirement thus tilts the playing field in such cases in favor of the defendant.
Indeed, the D.C. Circuit declined to adopt the balancing test of section 403(2)
in part because the difficulty and unpredictability of its application create
"powerful incentives for increased litigation on the jurisdictional issue itself."'"
Even if the standard did not change the outcome of judicial opinions, it could
result in reduced settlements for plaintiffs in civil cases and reduced plea
bargains for defendants in criminal cases. This result should not come about
from the importation of a reasonableness test from the Restatement. At best,
the reasonableness requirement, like other multipart tests and balancing
formulas, gives a patina of rationality to an area of law on which there is little
substantive agreement. 170
Second, the reasonableness requirement encourages the legalization of
policy disputes that are best addressed on a political-diplomatic level. As former
Legal Adviser Davis Robinson noted, "[a]n effort to limit questions of conflicts
of jurisdiction to purely legal questions of the power, or even the propriety, of
167. Metzger, supra note 21, at 7; see also id. (noting purpose of Restatements "should be to set out
existing law as accurately as possible"); Olmstead, supra note 24, at 476 ("If a proposed principle has not
been accepted as law, it has no place in a restatement."); id. at 485 ("By definition a restatement is designed
to reflect the law and not speculate as to what might be desirable.").
168. See Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
("Proedurally .... balancing would be difficult, since it would ordinarily involve drawn-out discovery and
requests for submissions by political branches.").
169. See Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also
Reinsurance Co. v. Administratia Asigurarilor, 902 F.2d 1275, 1283-84 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring) (questioning feasibility of applying Restatement's interest balancing as means of resolving
extraterritorial discovery disputes and declining to follow); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp.
1138, 1148 (N.D. 111. 1979) (rejecting balancing test approach in extraterritorial discovery dispute as
.unworkable").
170. See ANTHoNY T. KRONmAN, THE LosT LAwYER 348-49 (1993).
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exercising jurisdiction is bound to impose an analytical rigidity inconsistent with
the flexibility required by the widely-varying demands of diplomacy and foreign
policy."17 The executive branch is in the best position to decide when the
United States should defer to other states based on comity principles, rather
than raise the diplomatic stakes by arguing legal positions. Ultimately, disputes
such as those arising from the Helms-Burton Act are resolved through
diplomacy, not through international legal fora.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are two ways in which the ALI could, when it publishes the
Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law, rectify the misstatement of the
customary rules of prescriptive jurisdiction in the Restatement (Third). First,
it could delete the reasonableness requirement altogether. The nexus
requirement of section 402, which does reflect customary law, could be relied
on instead.
Second, the ALI could modify the presentation of the Restatement to
indicate clearly which rules provoked, as the reasonableness requirement did, 172
significant dissent within the organization. This is necessary because in contrast
to the drafting procedure for Restatements of domestic law, practitioners and
judges have no straightforward means to verify the Restatement (Third)'s
formulations. And despite the recognition that the Restatement (Third) has the
potential for greater influence than other Restatements, the ALI did not augment
its standard drafting procedure.1 73 Given this influence, more care should be
exercised to state the law accurately, either at the drafting stage or in the
presentation of the final product. Under the ALI's winner-take-all voting
system, the membership may decide something on a close vote but then state
a clear black letter rule as if it had received unanimous agreement. If the
restators act as judges do, they should publish dissents. The Restatement
(Fourth) could also adopt the method of the ALI's Corporate Governance
Project and include commentary distinguishing existing law from the ALI's
recommendations. 174
171. Robinson, supra note 96, at 1149.
172. For views expressed in ALI floor sessions dissenting from the reasonableness requirement, see
63 A.L.I. PRoc. 103 (1986) (comments of Sigmund Timberg) (arguing that case has not been made that
"failure to weigh evidence" under section 403(3) is violation of international law); 62 A.L.I. PROC. 407
(1985) (comments of Karl Meessen) (stating that the reasonableness requirement "ha[s] no foundation in
international law"); id. at 412 (comments of Professor Don Wallace Jr.) (questioning existence of cases
supporting subsections 403(2)-(3)); 58 A.L.I. PRoc. 259-60 (1981) (comments of Bennett Boskey) (noting
skepticism among Restatemaent advisors about "new test" introduced by section 403); id. at 265 (comments
of Cecil Olmstead) (agreeing with Boskey "in not finding anything in international law" supporting
section 403).
173. See REsrATMENT ('HmD) at xi (noting that drafting of Restatement (Third) followed "Institute
procedure"). For further description of the drafting process, see HAZARD, supra note 12, at 9-10; 1987
ASIL Panel, supra note 18, at 183-84 (comments of Detiev Vagts).
174. See Abrahamson, supra note 12, at 23; see also 1982 ASIL Panel, supra note 33, at 205
(remarks of Detiev Vagts) (recommending corporate governance project approach that would include
commentary stating where black-letter rules deviate from existing law); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Chief
[Vol. 22: 419
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By the time the Restatement (Fourth) is published, however, there may be
enough state practice supported by opinio juris, by the United States and others,
to support the reasonableness requirement as customary law.
Reporter's Foreword to PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS at
xxv (1994) (noting that Principles of Corporate Governance distinguish between "rules of law" in black
letter and "recommendations of corporate practice" which are stated in "a special gray-letter format").
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